Lethal Weapon 2x5
I've made some using the 'ible How-to-Make-a-Paracord-Fender-Keychain By removing the dowel and making it completely out of cord, you lessen it's image as a lethal weapon (plausible deniability). BUT, as we all know, if you reef down (tighten) all those knots it may as well be wood. With a marlinspike or awl you can make it as dense as pinewood. By paying attention to how tight you reef, you can vary the hardness from little more than foam to almost solid nylon. Keep in mind that nunchaku are LETHAL weapons when used as such. Cover your ass legally, and don't do anything stupid. Funny enough the way they are usually used to kill, is not with striking.
I'm going to make one. I wanted to make me a pair of those anyway to get a hang of such weapons and to practise using them, just in case....I think it should be possible to use foam inserts at the beginning and then swap with wooden ones by untying the diamond knots at the ends, sliding the foam out and sliding the wooden ones in and retie, if the foam sticks have the same diameter than the wooden ones. :)
This Frontline Perspective, the third in a series from CAR's field operations in Afghanistan between 2019 and 2021, reports on two commercial supply lines through which the Taliban sought to procure thermal imaging weapon sights. These sights, manufactured in the past five years, were commercially available in the United States and United Arab Emirates.
Since the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan in mid-August 2021, concerns have grown over the changing terrorist landscape in the country and the threat posed by groups such as the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP). This second Frontline Perspective focuses on weapons used in two high-profile attacks in Kabul: the May 2019 Taliban-claimed attack on Counterpart International, and the November 2020 ISKP-claimed attack on Kabul University. It helps shine a spotlight on tactics and weapon selection for such high-profile attacks, and highlights important similarities between the weapons used.
Recent Taliban seizures of equipment previously provided to Afghan National Defence and Security Forces (ANDSF) by the United States and NATO probably constitutes one of the most significant large-scale diversion of military equipment in recent history. This Frontline Perspective, the first in a series from CAR's investigations in Afghanistan, explores the long-standing capacity of the Taliban and other armed actors in Afghanistan to access weapons that had been issued to ANDSF, and considers the systemic challenges that have enabled weapon diversion from national custody.
The findings of an 18-month investigation mapping the human and financial networks behind the global procurement of goods and technologies for Islamic State weapons production. Shows how Islamic State procurers concealed their efforts behind front companies, pseudonymous communications and proxy purchasers.
This dispatch tracks the evolution of Houthi unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), which have become increasingly lethal and powerful. CAR finds that the Yemeni group is able to domestically manufacture some components while procuring more sophisticated electronic items from foreign supply networks.
This report is the result of more than three years of field investigation into Islamic State supply chains. It presents an analysis of more than 40,000 items recovered from the group between 2014 and 2017. These items encompass weapons, ammunition, and the traceable components and chemical precursors used by the group to manufacture improvised explosive devices.
This Dispatch is the result of field investigations during the initial phases of the assault on IS forces in eastern Mosul. It provides clear evidence of IS ability to manufacture weapons on an industrial scale, with output running into the tens of thousands.
CAR field teams entered Fallujah three days after the Iraqi city was liberated from IS control, to discover an IED factory with evidence of industrialised production and bureaucratic organisation of improvised weapons.
This report presents preliminary findings from a six-month field investigation from April to September 2014 into weapons used by non-state armed groups in the Central African Republic. It finds military vehicles and ammunition newly-supplied to Séléka rebel forces from Sudan during 2013, and military material from European suppliers originally supplied to Bozizé-era government forces and to other countries.
A guide to identifying marks on Kalashnikov-pattern assault rifles. This field guide provides comprehensive information on the design and positioning of marks applied to more than 30 models of Kalashnikov-pattern weapons from around the world. 59ce067264